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SOUTH CAUCASUS IN THE FOREGIN POLICY 
OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION. DO DOCTRINAL 
ASSUMPTIONS TRANSLATE INTO REALITY?
Foreign policy is largely determined by population size, military power and eco­
nomic potential of a country. Taking historical experience into account, we can see that 
countries with a hegemonic status in a given region have always sought both to expand 
their territories and to exert influence on their neighbours. The entire history of the Rus­
sian Empire, the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation itself (created in 1991) is an 
excellent case in point here. All the actions Moscow has taken and still takes are aimed 
at weakening cooperation between the post-Soviet states and Western structures (such 
as NATO or the European Union), and consequently reintegrating the post-Soviet space 
under the Kremlin’s leadership.
THE CIS AREA IN THE DOCTRINAL ASSUMPTIONS 
OF THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
South Caucasus, in addition to being part of the so-called near abroad, is also of 
great importance for Russia due to its strategic location and energy resources (Region, 
2008: 251). Moreover, influence in this region is perceived by the Federation as one of 
the key factors determining its position in the international arena and a condition for 
bolstering its great power status. The broader Caucasus is also a source of potential dan­
gers to Russia, such as Islamic fundamentalism, terrorism, drug smuggling, or illegal 
immigration (Falkowski, 2006).
When discussing the directions and doctrinal assumptions of Russia’s foreign pol­
icy, it is necessary to refer to the 4 main ideological orientations that have clashed with 
each other since 1985. It is connected with the fact that there has always been quite 
a strong polarization among the Russian elites on the issue of conducting foreign pol­
icy. The first stream is the supporters of the so-called new political thinking from the 
time of Mikhail Gorbachev and the perestroyka he formulated. The concept was based 
primarily on recognizing general human, universal values, such as peace, security, free­
dom, sovereignty, or respect for human rights. It also called for the creation of the 
so-called common European home that would contribute to the elimination of the divi­
sion of Europe into opposing political blocs (Federacja, 2002: 263). Gorbachev’s pol­
icy was based on a departure from the Soviet foreign policy to date, or repudiation of 
the Brezhnev doctrine. One proof that the change was more than just declarative was 
Moscow’s refraining from extending the so-called fraternal assistance to the govern-
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ments of the Eastern bloc countries in their clashes with democratic opposition 
(Wlodkowska, 2006: 76). Supporters of new political thinking proclaimed that security 
could not be built on a one-sided basis, because it is the result of joint efforts of the en­
tire humanity, regardless of its political or ideological differences (Federacja, 2002: 
261). This policy contributed, for example, to the transition from confrontation to coop­
eration with the West, the initiation of the processes of democratization in the Central 
and Eastern European countries, or the reunification of Germany (Bieleń, 2006: 63).
The second stream is the so-called pro-Western orientation. Its adherents were often 
called zapadniki, Atlanticists, or new realists. This way of thinking was represented by 
Russian politicians who were in power in early 1990s, such as the then Prime Minister 
Yegor Gaydar, or foreign minister Andrey Kozyrev. The main assumption of this con­
cept is the ascertainment that Russia’s place is in Europe rather than Asia. This posi­
tioning makes it necessary to bring the country closer to the West in the political and 
economic sphere, as well as, in some cases, the military one. Such rapprochement was 
to be facilitated by membership in, or at least partnership with, such Western structures 
as: the European Union, OECD, WTO, the World Bank, the International Monetary 
Fund, or NATO (Golas, 2013). Supporters of this orientation advocated that the most 
appropriate way for Russia in foreign policy was the strategy of bandwagoning with the 
strongest, meaning the West, to further its own interests (Polityka, 2006: 28). The con­
cept assumed the existence of several circles. The diagnosis by the Atlanticists pointed 
out that the Soviet Union in its period of decline and the new Russia were sidelined in 
the development of the international relations system. Russia’s objective was to quickly 
move to the center of the system, to the most developed countries making up the G-7 
(Federacja, 2002: 266). This period included the signing of the Russia-US “Charter of 
partnership and friendship”, which provided for the development of dialogue on differ­
ent levels between the two former superpowers. Interestingly, the ruling team in 
1991-92 that represented this stream did not oppose the expansion of NATO. Some pol­
iticians (e.g. Boris Yeltsin and A. Kozyrev) even made statements about the possibility 
of Russia itself joining the Alliance at some point. That’s because NATO was then con­
sidered an important instrument for safeguarding Euro-Atlantic security. The period of 
Atlanticists’ domination in foreign policy lasted just two years (1991-1992). A subse­
quent shift was caused by disappointment with the attitude of Western countries, since 
Russia did not receive any significant financial assistance from the West, nor was it 
brought into the Western economic, political or military structures. Russia’s position 
was also ignored on important matters such as the so-called near abroad, or the issue of 
the conflict in the former Yugoslavia (Bieleń, 2006: 69).
The third orientation is the so-called Eurasians. The main assumption of the adher­
ents of this stream is the uniqueness of Russia itself and its civilizational and cultural 
distinctness from Europe. This is the so-called third way concept. It sees Russia acting 
as a bridge connecting the two such different worlds -  the oriental East and the prag­
matic West. Eurasians believed that the Russian government focused too much on the 
Western direction in foreign policy, neglecting the other directions -  the eastern and the 
southern ones. They maintained that the CIS region is an extremely important area for 
the Russian Federation, because it is a sort of lever to return to the international arena as 
a power. It is also in its interest to eliminate the influence of third countries in the re­
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gion, above all the United States. Russia should also be the first defender of independ­
ence and sovereignty of its immediate neighbours, and also extend assistance, without 
imposing any forms of government. Eurasians (from the more democratic stream) in­
fluenced foreign policy in 1993, when, upon their urging, foreign minister A. Kozyrev 
connected the issue of withdrawing Russian forces from the Baltic states with the issue 
of protecting the Russian-speaking population living there (Federacja, 2002: 274). In 
that period, the strategy towards the area of the Commonwealth of Independent States 
was defined by the “Foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation” of 23 April 
1993. In this document, relations with CIS countries were put first, ahead of those with 
the United States, Western Europe, or the Asia-Pacific region. Special importance was 
attached to solving conflicts and countering the destabilization of the post-Soviet area. 
Russia’s primary objective was to overcome such conflicts and to prevent their spread 
onto the territory of the Russian Federation. There is an evident conviction in this con­
cept that the security of Russia depends on the stability of the neighbouring countries. It 
also called for strengthening the common defense space and establishing a belt of good 
neighbourly relations along Russian borders. This concept also provided for Russia’s 
scientific and technical cooperation with the CIS countries and the development of 
a common economic space (Wlodkowska, 2006: 122). Also in this period, documents 
such the “Military doctrine” of 2 November 1993 and the “Strategic policy of the Rus­
sian Federation towards the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States” of 
14 September 1995 were adopted. The “Military doctrine”, just like the 1993 “Foreign 
policy concept of the Russian Federation”, pointed to the main security threats to Rus­
sia. For the first time, it critically referred to the expansion of military blocs into the CIS 
countries (meaning mainly NATO). The document also included a provision on the 
possible use of RF’s armed forces beyond its borders in order to defend its “vital inter­
ests”. The “Strategic policy of the Russian Federation towards the members of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States” already in its introduction affirmed the great 
importance Russia itself attaches to relations with the CIS member states. Its primary 
objective with regard to the post-Soviet space was to create an integrated (politically 
and economically) union of countries that would enjoy a strong position in the interna­
tional arena (CmpamezmecKuu, 1995).
The fourth stream is the so-called gosudarstvenniki, also called derzhavniki. The 
supporters of this orientation proclaim that the Russian state must be self-sufficient, 
strong and it should guarantee internal stability. A strong state is the best alternative 
for Russia, as opposed to the status of a power, which is an obstacle to achieving de­
velopment and stability. Russia, until it restores internal stability, needs to curtail its 
efforts to gain influence worldwide and focus strictly on the former USSR area, for 
which it is responsible (Wanczyk, 2007: 49). According to the derzhavniki, giving 
priority to the CIS area is not the same as power policy, since Russia is naturally pre­
destined to assume responsibility for the post-Soviet space and its reintegration. This 
mainly concerns economic integration between the region’s states (Wlodkowska, 
2006: 87). B. Yeltsin’s resignation as president on 31 December 1999 and the assump­
tion of his duties by Vladimir Putin ushered in a period of domination of the support­
ers of this concept. The most important documents on international matters issued 
early in the first presidency of V. Putin include: the “Military doctrine” and the “For­
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eign policy concept of the Russian Federation”. These documents were issued by the 
Kremlin authorities in 2000.
In the “Military doctine” of 21 April 2000, similarly to the previous one from 1993, 
attention was primarily paid to national security threats resulting from the expansion of 
military blocs with regard to the countries of the so-called near abroad. In this docu­
ment, the authors are particularly wary of cooperation between the post-Soviet states 
and NATO. It addresses the issue of conflicts arising close to Russian borders and the 
need to quickly resolve them. The entire post-Soviet region is, of course, treated here as 
Russia’s exclusive sphere of influence (Boeman, 2000).
Another document (dedicated to foreign policy) issued in 2000 was the “Foreign 
policy concept of the Russian Federation” (28 June 2000). In this act, one can find strat­
egies and policy measures towards the CIS, similar to those included in the earlier doc­
uments. It also refers to regional conflicts that occur in the CIS area or involve the 
post-Soviet countries. Russia’s primary objective is to seek to stabilize areas rich in en­
ergy resources. Importantly, in contrast to the 1993 “Foreign policy concept...”, the 
scope of Russian diplomacy’s conflict-solving efforts was expanded beyond the 
so-called near abroad -  to include, for example, efforts for peace in the Middle East 
(Wlodkowska, 2006: 112). Also in this document, the entire post-Soviet area is consid­
ered as the Federation’s exclusive sphere of influence. Foreign policy priorities include 
countering the expansion of influence of third countries in the region, as well as fight­
ing terrorism, extremism, drug trade and arms trafficking. The authors of the document 
also address the issues of protecting Russian minorities in the post-Soviet countries. It 
is noteworthy that the protection of the Russian language in the Commonwealth of In­
dependent States area was declared one of the objectives of Russian foreign policy 
(Polityka, 2006: 27).
On 12 July 2008, already under the new president Dmitriy Medvedev, a new “For­
eign policy concept of the Russian Federation” was adopted. Similarly to the above de­
scribed documents, the Russian Federation considers the CIS area as its priority 
(a “sphere of privileged interests”). In the document it was emphasized that Russia will 
seek to enhance cooperation with the post-Soviet countries in the field of security and 
fighting international terrorism, extremism and drug trade, as well as illegal immigra­
tion (K o ^ e ^ u n ,  2008).
The latest “Foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation” comes from 2013. 
The document signed by V. Putin on 12 February contains a very pessimistic assess­
ment of the state of international relations. According to its authors, it has a very nega­
tive impact on Russia itself. In their opinion, one is currently witnessing the rise of Asia 
(in political, economic, and military terms) in the international system. Western coun­
tries, which are struggling with an economic crisis, are also responsible for increasing 
destabilization of some regions of the world. The authors of the document refer here 
mainly to the events that took place during the Arab Spring, which swept away regimes 
in many countries in Africa and the Middle East. The collapse of the existing regimes 
triggered a huge crisis in those countries, and thus also contributed to the revival of rad­
ical Islamic movements. Referring in turn to the post-Soviet republics, it was stated that 
the area remains a priority direction in the Kremlin’s foreign policy. For Moscow, it is 
particularly important to re-integrate the region. Therefore, the Russian authorities will
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seek to enhance cooperation within such structures as the Eurasian Economic Union, or 
the Collective Security Treaty Organization (Konąenąun, 2013).
Then, in 2014, V. Putin signed a new “Military doctrine”. It included statements 
about threats from Russia’s most immediate neighbours. It pointed out that regimes act­
ing against the Federation’s interests could illegally take power in neighbouring coun­
tries. Therefore, Russia reserves the right to intervene (even militarily) in such cases. 
Significantly, NATO was named as Russia’s biggest threat (Boennax, 2014). It is a cru­
cial difference in relation to the previous military doctrines, which contained veiled 
statements that Russian authorities may be concerned about the expansion of other alli­
ances’ borders and infrastructure. Such provisions are obviously the fallout of the crisis 
that has gripped Ukraine since November 2013.
THE IMPLEMENTATION SPHERE OF THE RUSSIAN POLICY TOWARDS 
SOUTH CAUCASUS
The above doctrinal postulates referred not only to the South Caucasus area, but ob­
viously to the entire CIS region. Bearing them in mind, it is worth analyzing their im­
plementation with regard to the South Caucasus countries. Borrowing from Tadeusz 
Świętochowski, six primary objectives of Russia’s foreign policy with regard to the 
Trans-Caucasus countries can be listed: maintaining political and military presence, 
strengthening control over both production and transport of Caspian oil, striving to 
weaken the influence of its potential geopolitical rivals -  the United States, Turkey, and 
Western European countries, countering the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, protect­
ing the rights of Russian language speakers (mostly sparse and leaving the Trans-Cau­
casus voluntarily), and also preventing any harmful, from the Russian point of view, 
impact on North Caucasus (Świętochowski, 2006: 192-193).
Russia is yet to develop a uniform strategy of action towards the South Caucasus 
countries. Its very good relations with Armenia and bad relations with Georgia are 
a great case in point here. Russia relations with Georgia are marked by great mistrust, at 
times even hostility. Only in 1993-1997 was there a rapprochement between the two 
countries, as seen, for example, by Georgia’s accession to CIS (Materski, 2000: 270). 
At present, tense political and military relations also affect economic ties between the 
two nations.
A bone of contention in their mutual relations is Georgia’s territorial integrity and 
related attempts at independence, starting from early 1990s, by two provinces: 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The reason for hostile relations between Russia and Geor­
gia was unofficial support for separatist units of the rebellious provinces in the 1990s. 
Russia’s assistance was extremely important, because the separatists were highly un­
likely to prevail in an open confrontation with Georgia’s central government (Region, 
2008: 213). Russia, in its doctrinal assumptions (from early 1990s till now), has offi­
cially declared a desire to settle all the conflicts in the CIS area, including those in the 
Trans-Caucasus, but this commitment can only be described as “declarative”. The sup­
port for both the republics, as quasi-states independent from Georgia, provides the op­
portunity to control them, and dampen or inflame the conflict, depending on the state of
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Georgian-Russian relations (Region, 2008: 259). It appears, however, that Russian au­
thorities will seek to integrate the two quasi-states with Russia as much as possible. 
One example here is the signing of the “Russian-Abkhaz treaty of alliance and strategic 
partnership” on 24 November 2014. The document provides for cooperation in the 
sphere of defense, border controls, customs, and in the social sphere. It is a document 
that in a way expands and complements the “Agreement on friendship, cooperation and 
mutual assistance”, which was signed back in 2008. Western countries and Georgian 
authorities considered the signing of this treaty as a step towards Abkhazia’s annex­
ation by Russia (Falkowski, 2014b). Similar actions have been taken by Russians with 
respect to South Ossetia. On 18 March 2015 in Moscow, president V. Putin and the 
breakaway South Ossetia’s leader Leonid Tibilov signed the “Russian-Ossetian treaty 
of alliance and integration”, which provided for a full integration with Russia, e.g. in 
the spheres of customs, defense and internal security (Falkowski, 2015).
The “rose revolution” that broke out in November 2003 also casts a shadow on the 
Russian Federation’s relations with Georgia. The pro-Western stance of President 
Mikhail Saakashvili, elected at the time, caused strong opposition and fierce rhetoric 
from Russia. The Russians particularly resented the fact that the camp of the leader of 
the United National Movement openly declared it would seek membership in Western 
structures (such as NATO) and eliminate people with communist background from 
public life and administration (Trzaskowski, 2009: 143).
The events of 2008, or Georgia’s war against Russia, and also the Russian Federa­
tion’s recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, led to a further deterioration of bilat­
eral relations (Matusiak, 2012: 8). As a result of the war, Georgia officially broke 
diplomatic relations with Russia in early September o f2008, maintaining only consular 
relations. In the same year, it also decided to quit CIS. The conflict also saw a wide­
spread use of the postulate so often highlighted in many documents issued by Russian 
authorities, the protection of the Russian population or Russian language speakers in 
the areas where the conflict took place. It is noteworthy, however, that after the removal 
of M. Saakashvili’s camp from power and its takeover by the Georgian Dream (2012), 
relations between the two countries have improved in some areas. One example here is 
e.g. the opening of the Russian market to Georgian goods, or the restoration of direct air 
services. But what has not changed is Russia’s primary objective, or its consistent drive 
to make Georgia abandon the pro-Western course charted back in 2003 (Falkowski, 
2014a).
Of all the Caucasian countries, Armenia has the best relations with Russia. This 
country is Russia’s biggest and apparently staunchest ally. To understand this stance of 
the Yerevan authorities, it is necessary to refer to historical experiences. For centuries, 
a belief has prevailed among the residents of this country that Russia is indeed their 
main protector against the Turkish threat. This threat is one of the most important ele­
ments of the Armenian national consciousness (Polityka, 2006: 99) (as seen, for exam­
ple, in the ever-living memory of the Armenian massacre perpetrated by the Turks in 
1915). Armenia’s dependence on Russia has increased even more in recent years. This 
is related to two strategic decisions taken by the Yerevan government in 2013. These 
were its green light for Gazprom to take over a controlling stake in a monopolistic con­
cern distributing gas in Armenia, and joining the Eurasian Economic Union. In Septem­
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ber 2013, Armenian president Serzh Sargsyan and V. Putin adopted a statement on the 
accession of Armenia to the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan 
(Ananicz, 2013) and the Eurasian Economic Union (Jarosiewicz, Fischer, 2015).
A very important issue in bilateral relations is the Azeri-Armenian conflict over 
Nagorno Karabakh. Russia plays a similar role there to the above described conflicts 
between Georgia and Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Its actions aim to maintain the exist­
ing status quo as long as possible. Russia’s official position on this issue boils down to 
advocating a peaceful solution to the conflict between the two countries. It should be 
noted, however, that during armed clashes the Russians unofficially gave military aid to 
Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh (Region, 2008: 259). In this conflict, Russia tries to 
play the role of a mediator between Armenia and Azerbaijan. It took the credit for ham­
mering out a ceasefire agreement between the warring parties (signed on 12 May 1992) 
at the 1994 CSCE summit (Bryc, 2004: 53). Russia’s role in this conflict is to some ex­
tent determined by Russian interests in the Caucasus region. The Federation’s uses the 
territories of the South Caucasus states (including the unrecognized Republic of 
Nagorno Karabakh) as a buffer zone to protect itself from the influence of other re­
gional actors, such as Turkey or Iran.
Russia also provides support to Armenia in the event of internal crises and opposi­
tion demonstrations against the state authorities (e.g. during the events that took place 
in autumn of 2003 and spring of 2004). The support is usually extended through direct 
meetings of both presidents. The Armenian authorities realize that in case of an out­
break of a “colour revolution” (similar, say, to the one that took place in Georgia), they 
can only hope for help from the Russian Federation (Region, 2008: 255).
What is more, Russia provides provides considerable military assistance to Armenia. 
Russian troops work with Armenian troops to secure the Armenian border. Significant 
numbers are also stationed at the military base in Gyumri. The presence of Russian forces 
in the 1990s was governed by two agreements: the “Agreement on the legal status of the 
armed forces of the Russian Federation stationed on the territory of Armenia”, which was 
signed on 21 August 1992, and the “Agreement on the Russian military base on the terri­
tory of Armenia” signed on 16 March 1995 (Wanczyk, 2007: 134-135). It also needs to 
be remembered that, unlike Georgia or Azerbaijan, Armenia is a member of CSTO.
Russia’s relations with the third South Caucasus country -  Azerbaijan -  are influ­
enced by three major problems: the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over 
Nagorno Karabakh, Russia’s desire to dominate the process of production and transport 
of oil and natural gas from the Caspian Sea shelf, and Russia’s influence over the shape 
of changes taking place in the political life of Azerbaijan.
But at the very beginning it is worth taking a look at the evolution of Russian-Azeri 
relations in the 1990s (Polityka, 2006: 92). Early in the last decade of the XX century, 
under president Albufaz Elchibey, Azerbaijan pursued a clearly pro-Western foreign 
policy. The then-government called for stronger cooperation with the West, and with 
the culturally close countries of Turkey and Iran, while demanding the withdrawal of 
the Russian forces stationed on the territory of Azerbaijan. This trend clearly changed 
in 1993, when Gaydar Aliyev became president. Even though the foreign policy he pur­
sued was oriented more towards cooperation with Moscow and the CIS, it was not al­
ways fully in line with Russian interests. Declaring a desire to cooperate with the West
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(on the issue of building democracy, free market), the Azerbaijani government hoped 
not so much for assistance in democratizing the country, but for support in the conflict 
over Nagorno Karabakh. Since 2003, G. Aliyev’s son Ilham has been trying to pursue 
a very similar policy.
Russia currently does not take a clear position on the issue of the future status of 
Nagorno Karabakh (i.e. whether it should constitute an integral part of Azerbaijan, or 
be a sovereign country). Despite officially advocating a peaceful solution to the con­
flict, the Kremlin in fact supports the Armenian side. The support provided to the Ar­
menians does not, however, cover the entire history of the dispute. It is noteworthy 
that in the early phase of the conflict over Nagorno Karabakh, the Russians helped 
Azerbaijan. A radical shift came in 1992, when the reformist and pro-Western 
A. Elchibey became president. One of the main reasons for discontinuing military aid to 
Azerbaijan was its decision to withdraw from CIS. In response, the Russian govern­
ment not only began to back Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh forces militarily, but also 
imposed economic sanctions on Azerbaijan (e.g. raised customs duties on Azeri goods, 
while most Russian businesses cancelled commercial contracts concluded earlier) 
(Polityka, 2006: 92). After G. Aliyev took over power, Azerbaijan rejoined CIS, but, 
significantly, it managed to avoid deployment of Russian troops on its territory.
Azerbaijan strives to pursue a policy independent from Russia, primarily in the eco­
nomic sphere. The oil and gas sector not only underpins the economy, it is also an im­
portant determinant of Azerbaijan’s domestic and foreign policies. The key thing here 
is the interest of Western countries, which constantly seek alternative suppliers of en­
ergy resources (e.g. the development of the Southern Gas Corridor). It is also worth 
adding that the current president I. Aliyev pursues a strategy where the main objective 
is to build economic power. Boosting its strength in the energy field would lead to the 
restoration of Azerbaijan’s proper place in the international arena in the near future, and 
also help to eliminate conflicts in the Trans-Caucasus, naturally including a solution to 
the Nagorno Karabakh conflict (Western investments would bring greater concern for 
security and stability in the region, and also lead to a weakening of Russian influence) 
(Region, 2008: 115). Examples of an independent (from Russia) energy policy can be 
seen in two pipelines: Baku -  Supsa (opened in 1999) and Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
(opened in 2006), as well as the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline (opened in early
2007). This energy policy, of course, causes great discontent and anxiety in Russia, 
which had a monopoly on supplying energy resources to external markets until the first 
of the above mentioned pipelines was opened (Geopolityka, 2008: 158). Azerbaijan 
also received an official invitation to join the Eurasian Economic Union in June 2014, 
but the government in Baku has refrained from accession so far (Jarosiewicz, 2014b). 
This is, of course, related to the fact that Azerbaijan wants to conduct its own policy 
(particularly in the energy field), and joining the Eurasian Economic Union would 
mean it would have to take the Kremlin’s opinion into account.
A significant issue that demonstrates the independent policy of Azerbaijan towards 
the Russian Federation is also the absence of Russian military bases on its territory. 
Neither has Azerbaijan agreed to cooperate on border protection or to bring in CIS 
peacekeeping forces (Wańczyk, 2007: 141-142). It should also be remembered that 
Azerbaijan is not a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization.
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When it comes to the third of the above mentioned problems (Russia’s influence over 
the shape of changes in the political life of Azerbaijan), it is in the Kremlin’s interest for 
the group around president I. Aliyev to remain in power for as long as possible. The cur­
rent elite enjoys goodpersonal relations with representatives ofthe Russian elite, because 
it comes from the old communist nomenclature (Region, 2008: 255-256). These good 
contacts are to be seen mainly in the Kremlin’s backing for the authoritarian regime of 
I. Aliyev. What also binds representatives of Azerbaijani and Russian elites is a similar 
worldview (a product of the Soviet times) and similar patterns of action (especially the 
use of similar methods towards the opposition). Russia, unlike the West, does not criticize 
the Azerbaijani government for cracking down on the opposition (through arrests, beatings, 
demonstration bans) and considers it an internal matter of this country (Falkowski, 2006). 
With regard to democratic standards, the ruling camp centered around I. Aliyev has been in­
creasingly moving away from the West with its behavious in recent years. Western calls for 
democratization and respect for human rights in Azerbaijan cast a shadow on relations be­
tween the West and Azerbaijan. The United States and the European Union had many reser­
vations about the 2009 constitutional amendment (which abolished a presidential term 
limit) and, indeed, about the presidential elections held on 9 October 2013.
IN THE DIRECTION OF IMPERIAL POLICY
Russian policy in South Caucasus is not a fully effective policy, as Russia’s actions 
towards Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia are dominated by bilateral relations rather 
than a single, coherent strategy towards the region. The policy towards these countries 
also bears the hallmarks of an imperial policy, since it boils down to rewards (in the po­
litical, economic or military sphere) for cooperation, or punishments for any action 
against Russian interests. An excellent case in point are, for example, Russia’s moves 
towards Armenia (a gas price cut in exchange for joining the Eurasian Economic Un­
ion), or towards Georgia (the 2008 military intervention, which greatly complicated 
this country’s path to future NATO membership). In addition to enhancing bilateral re­
lations, Russia makes efforts (in accordance with documents issued by official bodies) 
to integrate the CIS area, of course including the Trans-Caucasus, under its leadership. 
The objective is to strengthen the political, economic and military ties weakened in the 
aftermath ofthe collapse ofthe USSR, and to restore its former position in the area. But 
it comes up short in these efforts, because not all the Caucasus countries are interested 
in Russian-led economic integration (within the Eurasian Economic Union), or politi­
cal and military integration (within CIS, CSTO).
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ABSTRACT
Russian policy in South Caucasus is not a fully effective policy, as Russia’s actions towards 
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia are dominated by bilateral relations rather than a single, co­
herent strategy towards the region. The policy towards these countries also bears the hallmarks 
of an imperial policy, since it boils down to rewards (in the political, economic or military 
sphere) for cooperation, or punishments for any action against Russian interests. In addition to 
enhancing bilateral relations, Russia makes efforts (in accordance with documents issued by of­
ficial bodies) to integrate the CIS area, of course including the Trans-Caucasus, under its leader­
ship. But it comes up short in these efforts, because not all the Caucasus countries are interested 
in Russian-led economic integration (within the Eurasian Economic Union), or political and m il­
itary integration (within CIS, CSTO).
Key words: South Caucasus, Russian Federation, the foreign policy, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Georgia
KAUKAZ POŁUDNIOWY W POLITYCE ZAGRANICZNEJ FEDERACJI 
ROSYJSKIEJ -  CZY ZAŁOŻENIA DOKTRYNALNE PRZEKŁADAJĄ SIĘ NA
RZECZYWISTOŚĆ?
STRESZCZENIE
Polityka Rosji na Kaukazie Południowym nie jest polityką w pełni efektywną, bowiem 
działania Rosji wobec Armenii, Azerbejdżanu i Gruzji są zdominowane przez relacje dwustron­
ne, a nie poprzez jednolitą spójną strategię wobec regionu. Polityka wobec tych państw ma także 
znamiona polityki imperialnej, bowiem sprowadza się do ich nagradzania (czy to w sferze poli­
tycznej, gospodarczej czy militarnej) za współpracę, bądź też karania za wszelkie wystąpienia 
przeciwko interesom Rosji. Oprócz budowania stosunków dwustronnych Rosja podejmuje 
(w zgodności z dokumentami wydawanymi przez oficjalne ograny) działania integracyjne ob­
szaru WNP, w tym i oczywiście Zakaukazia pod jej przywództwem. Na tym polu nie odnosi jed­
nak wielkich sukcesów, bowiem nie wszystkie kraje kaukaskie są zainteresowane integracją 
gospodarczą (w ramach Euroazjatyckiej Unii Gospodarczej) czy polityczno-wojskową (w ra­
mach WNP, OUBZ) pod przywództwem Rosji.
Słowa kluczowe: Kaukaz Południowy, Federacja Rosyjska, polityka zagraniczna, Armenia, 
Azerbejdżan, Gruzja
